In 1861, the Mexican peso was established as the official currency of Mexico, forty years after the country's independence.

Backus and Driffill's work in 1985 introduced a standard modeling setup that includes uncertainty about policymakers' preferences and exogenous shocks affecting variables in those preference functions.

Blanco and Garber analyze the pattern of recurrent devaluation and speculative attacks on the Mexican Peso in their study.

In December 1987, the Mexican government fixed the exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar, which was a key factor in bringing down inflation levels in Mexico.

Zedillo was part of the team that implemented the adjustment program under President Salinas in 1988.

Between January 1990 and December 1993, the Mexican peso depreciated in nominal terms by approximately 17 percent, impacting the country's economic stability.

The twelve-month ahead expected depreciation rate for Mexico from January 1991 to December 1994.

In November 1991, Mexico adopted a crawling peg exchange rate system with adjustable bands, allowing the peso to depreciate at a predetermined rate relative to the U.S. dollar.

James M. Boughton's book chapter 'Tequila Hangover: The Mexican Peso Crisis and Its Aftermath' in 2012 delves into the events surrounding the Mexican Peso Crisis during the 1990s.

By the end of 1993, the intervention band for the Mexican peso widened from 1 percent to 9 percent, allowing for more flexibility in the exchange rate policy.

On November 7, 1994, analysts at Bear, Stearns released a report titled 'Mexican Pesos and Cetes are Attractive', stating that political and technical issues had undervalued the peso. They predicted a strengthening of the peso in the upcoming months, leading to high dollar returns on Cetes.

On November 22, 1994, analysts at Salomon Brothers published a report titled 'Mexico: Zedillo reaffirms the Pacto', where they expressed their belief that a one-off devaluation of the peso was highly unlikely, despite the possibility of a more rapid depreciation in the future.

After the Zedillo administration took office on December 1, 1994, political unrest in Chiapas intensified, raising concerns about the stability of Mexico's external position.

The Mexican peso crisis was triggered by the Mexican government's sudden devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar in December 1994, leading to one of the first international financial crises caused by capital flight.

On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float, resulting in a 15% depreciation. The peso's value dropped by roughly 50% from 3.4 MXN/USD to 7.2, leading to significant economic challenges.

Between December 20, 1994, and January 3, 1995, the Mexican peso depreciated by about 30 percent from its pre-devaluation rate. This depreciation led to a significant economic impact, including a sharp rise in domestic interest rates.

By January 10, 1995, domestic interest rates in Mexico rose sharply, with the 28-day Cetes rate increasing nearly three-fold to an annualized level of 45 percent. This rise in interest rates reflected the economic challenges faced during the Mexican Peso Crisis.

The U.S. Congress passed the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995 in response to a crisis. Enacted by President Clinton, the law allocated financial assistance for swap facilities and securities guarantees using American taxpayer dollars, along with support from the IMF.

Following the 1995 economic crisis in Mexico, extreme poverty surged to 37% in 1996 from 21% in 1994. Urban areas were hit harder than rural areas, with a significant decline in household incomes and increased unemployment rates.